package org.bouncycastle.crypto.tls;

/**
 * RFC 5246 7.2.
 */
public class AlertDescription
{
    /**
     * This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this
     * connection. Note that as of TLS 1.1, failure to properly close a connection no longer
     * requires that a session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 ("The session becomes
     * unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper close_notify messages with level
     * equal to warning.") to conform with widespread implementation practice.
     */
    public static final short close_notify = 0;

    /**
     * An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be
     * observed in communication between proper implementations.
     */
    public static final short unexpected_message = 10;

    /**
     * This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This alert also MUST be
     * returned if an alert is sent because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it
     * wasn't an even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't
     * correct. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between
     * proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).
     */
    public static final short bad_record_mac = 20;

    /**
     * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks
     * against the CBC mode [CBCATT]. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations.
     */
    public static final short decryption_failed = 21;

    /**
     * A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record
     * decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always
     * fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except
     * when messages were corrupted in the network).
     */
    public static final short record_overflow = 22;

    /**
     * The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive
     * length). This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between
     * proper implementations.
     */
    public static final short decompression_failure = 30;

    /**
     * Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to
     * negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a
     * fatal error.
     */
    public static final short handshake_failure = 40;

    /**
     * This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant
     * implementations.
     */
    public static final short no_certificate = 41;

    /**
     * A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.
     */
    public static final short bad_certificate = 42;

    /**
     * A certificate was of an unsupported type.
     */
    public static final short unsupported_certificate = 43;

    /**
     * A certificate was revoked by its signer.
     */
    public static final short certificate_revoked = 44;

    /**
     * A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
     */
    public static final short certificate_expired = 45;

    /**
     * Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it
     * unacceptable.
     */
    public static final short certificate_unknown = 46;

    /**
     * A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This message is
     * always fatal.
     */
    public static final short illegal_parameter = 47;

    /**
     * A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted
     * because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted
     * CA. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short unknown_ca = 48;

    /**
     * A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not
     * to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short access_denied = 49;

    /**
     * A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the
     * length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal and should never be
     * observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted
     * in the network).
     */
    public static final short decode_error = 50;

    /**
     * A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a
     * signature or validate a Finished message. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short decrypt_error = 51;

    /**
     * This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant
     * implementations.
     */
    public static final short export_restriction = 60;

    /**
     * The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.
     * (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is
     * always fatal.
     */
    public static final short protocol_version = 70;

    /**
     * Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the
     * server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is
     * always fatal.
     */
    public static final short insufficient_security = 71;

    /**
     * An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory
     * allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short internal_error = 80;

    /**
     * This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user
     * cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending
     * a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This
     * message is generally a warning.
     */
    public static final short user_canceled = 90;

    /**
     * Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client
     * hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when
     * that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert. At that point, the
     * original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this
     * would be appropriate is where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the
     * process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup, and
     * it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This
     * message is always a warning.
     */
    public static final short no_renegotiation = 100;

    /**
     * Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did
     * not put in the corresponding client hello. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short unsupported_extension = 110;

    /*
     * RFC 3546
     */

    /**
     * This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL
     * supplied by the client (see Section 3.3). This message MAY be fatal - for example if client
     * authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue and the server is
     * unable to retrieve the certificate chain, it may send a fatal alert.
     */
    public static final short certificate_unobtainable = 111;

    /**
     * This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not
     * recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal.
     */
    public static final short unrecognized_name = 112;

    /**
     * This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see
     * Section 3.6). This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short bad_certificate_status_response = 113;

    /**
     * This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided
     * certificate_hash. This message is always fatal.
     */
    public static final short bad_certificate_hash_value = 114;

    /*
     * RFC 4279
     */

    /**
     * If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an
     * "unknown_psk_identity" alert message.
     */
    public static final short unknown_psk_identity = 115;

    /*
     * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
     */

    /**
     * If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV appears in ClientHello.cipher_suites and the highest protocol version
     * supported by the server is higher than the version indicated in ClientHello.client_version,
     * the server MUST respond with an inappropriate_fallback alert.
     */
    public static final short inappropriate_fallback = 86;

    public static String getName(short alertDescription)
    {
        switch (alertDescription)
        {
        case close_notify:
            return "close_notify";
        case unexpected_message:
            return "unexpected_message";
        case bad_record_mac:
            return "bad_record_mac";
        case decryption_failed:
            return "decryption_failed";
        case record_overflow:
            return "record_overflow";
        case decompression_failure:
            return "decompression_failure";
        case handshake_failure:
            return "handshake_failure";
        case no_certificate:
            return "no_certificate";
        case bad_certificate:
            return "bad_certificate";
        case unsupported_certificate:
            return "unsupported_certificate";
        case certificate_revoked:
            return "certificate_revoked";
        case certificate_expired:
            return "certificate_expired";
        case certificate_unknown:
            return "certificate_unknown";
        case illegal_parameter:
            return "illegal_parameter";
        case unknown_ca:
            return "unknown_ca";
        case access_denied:
            return "access_denied";
        case decode_error:
            return "decode_error";
        case decrypt_error:
            return "decrypt_error";
        case export_restriction:
            return "export_restriction";
        case protocol_version:
            return "protocol_version";
        case insufficient_security:
            return "insufficient_security";
        case internal_error:
            return "internal_error";
        case user_canceled:
            return "user_canceled";
        case no_renegotiation:
            return "no_renegotiation";
        case unsupported_extension:
            return "unsupported_extension";
        case certificate_unobtainable:
            return "certificate_unobtainable";
        case unrecognized_name:
            return "unrecognized_name";
        case bad_certificate_status_response:
            return "bad_certificate_status_response";
        case bad_certificate_hash_value:
            return "bad_certificate_hash_value";
        case unknown_psk_identity:
            return "unknown_psk_identity";
        case inappropriate_fallback:
            return "inappropriate_fallback";
        default:
            return "UNKNOWN";
        }
    }

    public static String getText(short alertDescription)
    {
        return getName(alertDescription) + "(" + alertDescription + ")";
    }
}
